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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

exhausted gas field. Defendant also held rights in an adjoining field, and
when it commenced storing gas therein, the pressure in the first field
greatly increased making it evident for the first time that the two fields
were in fact connected. Defendant then restricted production of gas from
the field in which plaintiff held rights, and plaintiff brought this suit for
an accounting and injunction restraining artificial restriction of the production of gas from the first field. The court rejected the analogy to
animals ferae naturae and held title to natural gas is not lost by the injection of such gas into a natural underground reservoir for storage purposes.
The interest of the public in the maintenance of such reservoirs is evidenced by statutes in eleven states providing for condemnation of exhausted gas fields by natural gas utilities, 20 in addition to the statutes in
three states rejecting the Hammonds doctrine.2 1 These laws enable a
natural gas public utility to better provide for the seasonal demands for its
product by storing reserve gas during the warm months.
The decision in the principal case indicates a definite trend from the
Hammonds doctrine when considered with the statutes rejecting the doctrine and the decision in the White case. The trend appears sound from
the viewpoint of public policy and scientific knowledge. The analogy to
the "fanciful fox" has been discarded, and a rule based on sound principles
of property law has been supplied in its place. The result indicates a
sound re-evaluation of this field of law.
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 100,

§§ 100-9-1-100-9-7 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104,

9 104-112 (1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 55, §§55-120100055-1206 (Supp. 1959); Ky.
REV. STAT. ch. 278, § 278.501 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 230, S22.1672 (Supp. 1959);
Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 393,

§§ 393.410-393.510 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 60, §§ 60-

801-60-805 (Supp. 1957); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 57, SS 57.601-57.607 (Cum. Supp. 1959);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 36.1-36.7 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. tit. 52 § 2401 (Supp. 1960);
W. VA. CoDEANN. ch. 54, § 5362 (2) (c) (1961).
2

1Supra note 4.

SALES-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver by the Keal Driveaway Company. While he was delivering a new truck which had been manufactured
by the defendant, the brakes on the truck suddenly locked causing it to
overturn, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. An action was brought for
personal injuries based on negligence and implied warranty. The trial
court dismissed the action upon plaintiff's failure to plead further after
the court had sustained a motion requiring the plaintiff to allege facts in
his second cause of action (breach of implied warranty) showing privity
of contract between plaintiff and defendant. On appeal the Court of Ap-
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peals of Ohio held that plaintiff could not maintain an action on the theory of implied warranty because of lack of privity of contract, but it was
error to also dismiss the first cause of action based on negligence. Miller
v. Chrysler Corporation, 183 N.E. 2d 421 (Court of Appeals of Ohio,
1962). 1
In the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright2 the so-called "general
rule" was formulated that in actions based on breach of implied warranty
there must be a showing of privity of contract between the plaintiff and
defendant.8 The American courts quickly adopted this rule and it was not
until Thomas v. Winchester4 that the first exception to it was recognized
in all cases of products which are "inherently dangerous." ' Later, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 6 the "imminently dangerous" exception was
formulated. 7 Early in this century a third exception was grafted onto the
privity requirement when the courts recognized the manufacturers of
food products intended for human consumption should be held strictly
liable to ultimate consumers for injuries caused by their negligence.8 In
many states the courts have recognized other exceptions to the privity
requirement where there has been fraud and misrepresentation on the part
of the manufacturer,8 and where the manufacturer, through his negligence, violates a statute intended for the public welfare. 10
Recently, a total of eleven states which previously recognized the ex'Contra: Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E. 2d 419 (1953). Here
the court held that an automobile is an imminently dangerous product which fals under
an exception to the privity requirement.
210 Mees &W 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402 (1842).
8 Russell v. Sessions Clock Co., 119 Conn. Supp. 425, 116 A. 2d 575 (1955).
46 N.Y. 397 (1852).
5Plaintiff recovered from the manufacturer for injuries sustained from using a jar of
belladonna which had been labeled "dandelion." The manufacturer sold to a druggist
who sold to plaintiff. Although there was no privity between plaintiff and the manufacturer, the court imposed strict liability because the nature of the article was such
as to create a risk of harm to users no matter how much care was used in its manufacture.
6217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7 The court held that the absence of privity rule applies to products that although
not dangerous by nature, are reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made.
8For example: Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P. 2d 375 (1958, Okla.); Sharpe v.
Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E. 2d 442 (1956); Mahoney
v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 46 Ohio OPS 250, 102 N.E. 2d 281 (1951); Minutilla v.
Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929).
9For example: Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Il1.App. 2d 494, 135 N.E. 2d 231 (1956);
Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn., 211 Mass. 449,98 N.E. 95 (1912).
10 Spencer v. Bolt, 82 Okla. 280, 200 Pac. 187 (1921).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

ceptions to the "general rule" repudiated the privity requirement in
toto. 11 These states follow today what has aptly been called the "enlight-

ened view." Thus, in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc.,12 where the Supreme Court of Michigan repudiated the old
rule, the court denounced it in these words:
American courts quickly fell upon the dictum in an 1842 English case (the
Winterbottom case)13 to relieve manufacturers of all liability, then grafted
upon it a bizarre cluster of 'exceptions,' which wondrously grew and grew,
until, in all truth-much like the boa constrictor swallowing itself-the exceptions swallowed the rule.
Again, in the Montana case of Larson v. U.S. Rubber Co., 14 the Federal
District Court applied the "enlightened view" in allowing the plaintiff to
recover in the absence of privity with the manufacturer for these reasons:
Modern mass-production manufacturers produce their product with the ultimate user in mind, and not for the use of the jobber or retailer who may be
in privity with the manufacturer, and the application of the law of negligence
will work no hardship in manufacturers, since, unless all of the elements of
negligence are present, there can be no recovery against the manufacturer.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals with manufacturers' liability and
privity of contract in § 2-318. The pertinent portion of the section reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such a person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty, . . .15
As of June 1, 1962, a total of eighteen states have adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code. 16 The minor language changes in § 2-318 as adopted in
different states have not gone to the substance of the section. It would
seem that this section solves the whole problem of privity because it ex11 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Ia.

1289, 110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961); Atkins v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571,

104 N.W. 2d 888 (1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.
2d 69 (1960); General Motors Corporation v. Dodson, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (Tenn., 1960);
B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F. 2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A. 2d 568 (1959); Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371,
94 N.W. 2d 597 (1959); Larson v. U.S. Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (1958); Babylon
v. Scruton, 215 Md. 229, 138 A. 2d 375 (1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and

Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958); G. Bernd Co. v. Rahn,
94 Ga. App. 713, 96 S.E. 2d 185 (1956).
12353 Mich. 120,90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958).

1' Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees &W 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402 (1842).
14

163 F. Supp. 327 (1958).

15 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, SS1-101 to 10-104.
10 U.L.A.: U.C.C. Art. 1-3-c.
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tends manufacturers' liability to all persons in the distributive chain.
However, the Committee Comments in § 2-318 neither reinforce nor discourage this view. The Committee maintains that this section is "neutral"
and not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether
the seller's warranty, given to his buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the distributive chain.
In the cases in which plaintiffs have contended that § 2-318 extends
manufacturers' liability to all persons in the distributive chain, the courts
have uniformly held that the section extends implied warranties only to
the buyer's household and guests. Therefore, what the courts have succeeded in doing is to limit the scope of § 2-318 by holding that it grafts
onto the "general rule" another exception and does not abolish the privity requirement except in this one instance. This exception may be stated
in the following manner: If a person suffers injury from a product and is
a guest or member of the household of the buyer, he may maintain an
action for breach of implied warranty against the seller in the absence of
privity of contract. Thus, in Facciolo Paving & ConstructionCompany v.
Road Machinery, Inc.," the Pennsylvania court spoke of § 2-318 as not
changing existing case law which requires privity of contract between
the parties in order to extend the seller's warranties to other persons in
the distributive chain. This case was decided several months before Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Company,i 8 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the requirement of privity was no longer necessary when suing
for breach of implied warranty based in personal injuries. However, the
plaintiff who was claiming under § 2-318 in Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A.
Williams Co., 19 was denied recovery on the basis of breach of implied
warranty for injuries sustained when the ladder that her employer purchased from a retailer collapsed. The court was of the opinion that an
allegation of privity was necessary for the plaintiff to maintain an action
for breach of implied warranty against the wholesaler who sold the retailer. It, therefore, seems that the Pennsylvania courts have not rejected
the privity requirement in toto, and are not going to reject it, in the near
future, on the basis of § 2-318.20
Recently, § 2-318 was involved in litigation in the courts of Connecti178

Pa. Chest. 375 (1959).

18 191 Pa. Super 422, 156 A. 2d 568 (1959). Accord: Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F.

Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
19 13 Pa. D. & C. 2d 14 (1957).
20 For other cases limiting the applicability of S2-318 to the buyer's household and
guests, see: Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Adams v. Schieb,
75 Pa. Dauph. 158 (1961). Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.
2d 80.
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cut in a case where a college cook who was injured by deleterious substances contained in a bar of soap purchased by her employer from a
retailer was denied recovery because the court felt that the words "all
the members of the buyer's household" would not include the plaintiff
21
who was an "employee" since the statute did not say "employees."
The status of privity requirement as enunciated in the decisions of the
Illinois courts reflects the view of the thirty-nine other states which still
adhere to the "general rule" with its plethora of exceptions. For example,
a plaintiff who bought seed from a retailer was denied recovery from the
manufacturer when it later was shown that the seed was adulterated because "a manufacturer, under Illinois law, is not responsible in damages to
a person with whom it has no contractual relationship, and is not in
"22
privity ....
However, the Illinois courts recognize the well-known exceptions to
24
23
the privity requirement where the product is inherently or imminently
25 or where
dangerous, where the product is food for human consumption
26
the manufacturer fraudulently misrepresents his product.

The Uniform Commercial Code became law in Illinois on July 1, 1962.
There has been, to date, no case in which § 2-318 has been involved.
However, it seems clear that § 2-318 will have the effect of only adding
one more exception to the privity requirement where the person injured
is a guest or member of the household of the buyer. The Illinois Uniform
State Law Commission reinforces this view by stating: "The Illinois cases
are in accord with this section. ' 27 In support of this view the Commission
28
cites four Illinois cases, the first is an imminently dangerous product case
and the other three are food cases. 29 Therefore, it is clear that Illinois
will not hold § 2-318 as abolishing privity in manufacturers' liability, but
will consider it as grafting onto the "general rule" another exception.
21
22

Duont v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A. 2d 647 (1954).
Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n., 30 Ill. App. 2d 283, 174 N.E. 2d 697, 699

(1961).
App. 2d 226, 163 N.E. 2d 425
23 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., 18 Ill.
(1959).
App. 2d 47, 180 N.E. 2d 46 (1962).
24 Biller v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 Ill.
25

Haut v. Kleene, 320 II. App. 273, 50 N.E. 2d 855 (1943).

26

Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill.
App. 2d 494, 135 N.E. 2d 231 (1956).

27 ILLINOIS ANNOTATION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
28

p. 57.

Lindroth v. Walgreen, 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E. 2d 595 (1946), but see Lindroth
v. Walgreen, 388 Ill. App. 364, 87 N.E. 2d 307 (1949); affd. 407 111. 121, 94 N.E. 2d 847
(1950).
29 Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 IMI.App. 189, 59 N.E. 2d 320 (1945);
Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E. 2d 855 (1943); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co.,
App. 305, 47 N.E. 2d 739 (1943).
318 Ill.
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The dictum in a 19th century English case which formulated the requirement of privity in manufacturers' liability is still followed in forty
states today. This "general rule" is slowly being eroded away by numerous exceptions which, in truth, have become of more universal application than the rule itself; so that, it is only in the rare instance that plaintiffs are unable to fit the facts of their particular claim into the outstretched hands of an exception.
The Uniform Commercial Code has not been able to alleviate this problem with § 2-318. On the contrary, it has added to the confusion in this
field by adding onto the privity rule still another exception. Although the
purpose of § 2-318 was not to enlarge or restrict the developing case law
on manufacturers' liability, it has resulted in an affirmance of the "general
rule" in the states which have not repudiated the privity requirement. It
thus becomes clear, once again, that the requirement of privity in manufacturers' liability, which was fostered by judicial legislation, can only, in
the last analysis, be abolished by judicial legislation. No state legislature,
no matter how broad and sweeping its laws may appear to be, can ever
hope to abolish a doctrine so firmly ingrained in the fabric of the courts
that only they themselves can expunge it.

